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THE POST-GRANT LIFE: COORDINATING & STRATEGIZING 
CHALLENGES OF ISSUED PATENTS IN MULTIPLE CONTINENTS 
KAREN E. SANDRIK 
Abstract 
With the enactment of the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act (AIA), 
U.S. patent law gained a new post-grant opposition system and the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). While the U.S. post-grant opposition 
system has some similarities to the post-grant systems, such as that in the 
European Union, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia, there are 
also notable differences. Navigating one’s own post-grant system can be 
challenging, but doing so in multiple patent offices around the world is 
daunting. Differences in these proceedings not only present the potential 
for parties to make costly errors, but also to engage in strategic behavior. 
This Article discusses one such opportunity to engage in strategic behavior, 
one that is available due to a lack of international harmonization in the 
various post-grant systems around the world. In short, while the post-grant 
opposition system in the United States includes multiple estoppel statutes, 
there are no analogous estoppel statutes in many other post-grant systems, 
including that in the European Union and Japan. Because of this lack of 
harmonization, parties may test the strength of a competitor’s patent in 
multiple venues, as well as determine a competitor’s tolerance for 
financing simultaneous proceeding around the world. 
I. THE BASICS OF POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS IN EUROPE, U.S. 
AND JAPAN 
Since the 1970s, the European Patent Office (EPO) has provided a way 
for petitioners to challenge issued patents in post-grant opposition proceed-
ings.1 Currently, European oppositions must be filed within nine months of 
 
 Karen E. Sandrik, Associate Professor & Co-Director of the Business Lawyering Institute, Willamette 
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discussion. 
 1.  See Filip De Corte, Anthony C. Tridico, Tom Irving, Stacy D. Lewis & Christina N. Gervasi, 
AIA Post-Grant Review and European Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like 
Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH 93, 98 (2012) [hereinafter AIA Post-Grant Review]; see also 
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patent issuance. Assuming one pays the appropriate fees and follows other 
basic filing procedures, anyone can file a petition against as many claims of 
a patent and under as many theories as one desires.2 In terms of filing fees, 
the European opposition process is affordable, with an official fee around 
1,000 US dollars that is independent of how many claims are challenged, or 
grounds for such challenges are asserted.3 The petitioner does not have to 
reveal the party behind the petition, thereby permitting potential competitors 
the ability to shield their identity. The timeline of the post-grant process from 
start to finish is generally within an 18 to 30-month turnaround, with many 
oral decisions granted in a 15 to 24-month timeline.4 Accordingly, European 
oppositions can be a cost-effective and time-efficient mechanism for cen-
trally challenging an issued European patent. 
The U.S. only recently created an analogous post-grant system to that 
of the EPO. Conversations in the U.S. leading up to the AIA included dis-
cussion on international harmonization, including the appeal of introducing 
a post-grant opposition proceeding like that of the EPO.5  
Prior to the implementation of the AIA, post-grant ex parte reexamina-
tion and inter partes reexamination proceedings were available.6 These post-
grant reexaminations allowed patent holders to amend claims, with third par-
ties initiating inter partes reexamination and anyone initiating an ex parte 
examination, including the patent owner, a third party, or the Director of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).7 When the reexami-
nation process was initially introduced, Congressional records reveal the vi-
sion that reexamination through an administrative system would “permit ef-
ficient resolution of questions about the validity of issued patents without 
resource to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation.”8 In this way, the 
reexamination process could serve as a substitute for infringement litigation.9 
 
Olga Partington & Paul Calvo, On the Attack, STERNE KESSLER GOLDSTEIN FOX (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.skgf.com/uploads/1378/doc/EBR_April-15_pp.66-68_(Goldstein_and_Fox).pdf. 
 2.  Michael J. Flibbert, Leythem A. Wall & Maureen D. Queler, Coordinating European and U.S. 
Post-Grant Patent Opposition, FINNEGAN (Nov. 4, 2014), https://finnegan.com/en/insights/coordinating-
european-and-u-s-post-grant-patent-opposition.html. 
 3.  Schedule of Fees, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://my.epoline.org/portal/classic/epo-
line.Scheduleoffees (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
 4.  See Flibbert, supra note 2.  
 5.  See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. H4428 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Manzullo) (“This 
bill would finalize the shift towards a European-style patent system through changing from a ‘first-to-
invent’ to ‘first-to-file’ system; establishing a new set of ‘prior use’ rights; and adopting a third European 
style ‘post-grant’ challenge.”).  
 6.  See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012); see also id. §§ 311–318 (explaining the process of petitioning and 
conducting inter partes reexamination).  
 7.  ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1040 (6th ed. 2013). 
 8.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1 (1980). 
 9.  See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 1039. 
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Yet, this pre-AIA system fell short of an ideal reexamination process. Criti-
cism of pre-AIA post-grant proceedings included charges of insufficient 
third-party involvement,10 unfair bias favoring the patent holder,11 and lack 
of international harmonization of post-grant proceedings.12 
With the AIA came significant change to the U.S. post-grant opposition 
system, including the introduction of post-grant review (PGR), inter partes 
review (IPR), and covered business method review (CBM). After issuance 
of a patent, PGR is initially the only adversarial proceeding available to chal-
lenge the validity of the patent within the USPTO.  
Available grounds for challenging the patent through PGR include sub-
ject-matter eligibility, novelty, nonobviousness, and the written descrip-
tion.13 Anyone can file a PGR petition with one exception: those that have 
already or are currently in the process of challenging the validity of the same 
patent in a U.S. patent infringement lawsuit may not initiate a PGR.14 Unlike 
that of the European opposition, the petitioner must reveal the real party be-
hind the petition.15 Yet like a European opposition, the PGR petition must be 
filed within nine months of the patent grant.16 A PGR petition is submitted 
to the newly created PTAB, which is staffed by Administrative Patent 
Judges, many of whom are experienced patent prosecutors and, or, patent 
litigators.17 Although PGR is similar to European opposition proceedings, 
they are not as popular as European opposition proceedings.18 One potential 
reason is the difference in cost. Unlike the low filing fee of the European 
opposition proceedings, the minimum filing fee of a PGR are now $38,000, 
 
 10.  Christopher L. Logan, Patent Reform 2005: HR 2795 and the Road to Post-Grant Oppositions, 
74 UKMC L. REV. 975, 988 (2006).  
 11.  See Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted Road to Patent Reform: The New Invalidity 
Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 391 (2012). 
 12.  Although Congress initially looked to the example of European opposition proceedings, much 
changed during the course of legislation. Today, there are still arguments to be made that the U.S.’s 
system is disappointingly distinct from that of the European Patent Office. See AIA Post-Grant Review, 
supra note 1, at 96–97; see also Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives: New USPTO Post-Grant Review a 
Small Step for Patent Harmonisation, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2012/10/18/new-uspto-post-grant-review-a-small-step-for-patent-harmonisation/. 
 13.  See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).  
 14.  See id. § 325(a)(1). 
 15.  Id. § 322(b).  
 16.  Id. § 321(c). 
 17.  See Michael Wagner, An Introduction to Administrative Patent Judges at the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board, THE FEDERAL LAWYER (May 2015), at 36, available at http://www.fedbar.org/Re-
sources_1/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2015/May/Features/An-Introduction-to-Administrative-Patent-
Judges-at-the-Patent-Trial-and-Appeal-Board.aspx?FT=.pdf.  
 18.  Jeffrey A. Miller, Katie J.L. Scott & Bonnie Phan, Post-Grant Review: A Promising New Tool 
for Invalidating Patents?, ARNOLD & PORTER (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspec-
tives/publications/2017/01/post-grant-review-a-promising. 
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which covers patents with up to twenty claims.19 There are additional fees 
for each claim over twenty.20 
After the 9-month PGR period has expired, or after the termination of 
any post-grant review that has been instituted as to the at-issue patent, an IPR 
or CBM petition may be filed.21 Unlike in PGR or in a European opposition, 
an IPR petition may only challenge an issued patent on limited grounds, in-
cluding failure to satisfy the novelty or nonobviousness requirements, which 
must be argued only on the basis of prior patents or printed publications.22  
Similar to PGR, IPR challenges are available to anyone with a couple 
of exceptions. IPR is not available to the patent owner, nor is it available to 
those who have previously sought to invalidate a claim of the at-issue patent 
through a civil action.23 Like PGR, the petitioner must also reveal the real 
party of interest. Although narrower in scope, IPRs have quickly proved pop-
ular in terms of number of requests.24 They have also been the focus of much 
writing.25 
Even more recently than the U.S., Japan introduced its current version 
of a post-grant proceedings in 2015. This was actually a re-introduction of 
sorts, as Japan had a post-grant opposition prior to its termination in 2003.26 
The opposition system in Japan, in accordance to the rules and procedure of 
the Japan Patent Office (JPO), is open to anyone, with the option of hiding 
 
 19.  USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-re-
sources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) [hereinafter USPTO Fees]. 
These fees were recently increased on January 16, 2018. See Nathanael Luman & Kerry S. Taylor, USPTO 
to Increase IPR Fees by 33% and PGR Fees by 27% in 2018, KNOBBE MARTINS (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/11/uspto-increase-ipr-fees-33-and-pgr-fees-27-2018. 
 20.  USPTO Fees, supra note 19. This number does not include any litigation fees, merely the filing 
fee. 
 21.  This Article will not discuss CBMs in any detail, as they are more unique to the U.S.’s post-
grant opposition system.  
 22.  See 35 U.S.C § 311(b) (2012).  
 23.  See id. § 311(a), 315(a). 
 24.  In an early look at numbers, Brian Love and Shawn Ambwani explained that by late 2014, more 
than two thousand requests for IPR had been filed since the new procedure launched in 2011. See Brian 
Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 93, 93 (2014).  
 25.  See, e.g., Scott A. McKeown, PTAB Institution Rate Dips Into 60% Range, PATENTS POST-
GRANT (July 22, 2014), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-institution-rate-dips-into-60-range; 
Michelle Carniaux & Michael E. Sander, Instituted Patent Claims Survive in About One Third of All IPR 
Trials, INTER PARTES REVIEW BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014), http://interpartesreviewblog.com/instituted-patent-
claims-survive-one-third-ipr-trials/; Neal Solomon, The Problem of Inter-Partes Review (IPR), IP 
WATCHDOG (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/08/problem-inter-partes-review-
ipr/id=86287/; Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual 
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 45, 45 (2016). 
 26.  Miyako Saito & Manabu Hirata, Review of Current Status of Post-Grant Opposition System in 
Comparison with Invalidation Trial System, SEIWA PAT. & L. (April 29, 2016), http://www.sei-
wapat.jp/en/IP/pdf/en00027_PatentOpposition_vs._InvalidationTrial.pdf. 
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the real party in interest by naming a shell entity instead of the party itself.27 
Unlike both the European opposition and PGR, an opposition may only be 
filed against an issued patent within six months,28 not nine months like in 
those other systems. But like both the European opposition and PGR, the 
Japanese opposition has many grounds for opposition, including subject mat-
ter eligibility, novelty, and inventive step (the equivalent of non-obviousness 
in the U.S.).29 In terms of filing fees, the Japanese opposition requires a very 
modest initial filing fee, the equivalent of almost 150 US dollars, plus 22 US 
dollars for each challenged claim.30 
Overall, there are notable similarities and distinctions in the available 
post-grant proceedings across the world, with many useful articles exploring 
and comparing these post-grant proceedings.31 This Article briefly discusses 
one important difference in the post-grant system in the U.S. compared to 
that in Europe and Japan: the downstream effect on future post-grant pro-
ceedings of the same patent. In the U.S., there are estoppel statutes that work 
to reduce redundant filings and abusive litigation tactics. In Europe and Ja-
pan, there are no such analogous statutes. 
II. ESTOPPEL AT THE PTAB, PTO, AND JPO 
The Patent Act contains estoppel provisions for PGR, IPR, and CBM. 
IPR estoppel is established under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), which provides that 
“[t]he petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent . . . that re-
sults in a final written decision . . . may not request or maintain a proceeding 
before the Office with respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner 
raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”32 
Subpart 2 of § 315(e) contains near identical language that pertains to litigat-
ing in a civil action or the International Trade Commission (ITC).33 
 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Schedule of Fees, JAPAN PAT. OFF., https://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/ryoukin_e/ryokine.htm 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2018); see also Overview of New Post-Grant Opposition System in Japan, SEIWA 
PAT. & L., http://www.seiwapat.jp/en/IP/20150407.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).  
 31.  See Flibbert, supra note 2; Jennifer R. Turchyn, Note, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-
Grant Claim Amendments: A Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant 
Proceedings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1500 (2016); Partington & Calvo, supra note 1; Masayuki Ogura, 
Tips for Using the Post-Grant Opposition System, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 6, 2017), 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3748777/Tips-for-using-the-post-grant-opposition-system.html.  
 32.  35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2012).  
 33.  Id. § 315(e)(2). 
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While pulling particular soundbites of legislative history does not pro-
vide a complete picture, “[t]he legislative history of this [IPR estoppel] pro-
vision suggests that Congress intended to prevent the same party from chal-
lenging the validity of the same patent twice, at least based on patents or 
printed publications that the PTAB considered.”34 Moreover, then-director 
of the USPTO, David Kappos, stated that the IPR estoppel statute, as well as 
the estoppel statutes relating to PGR and CBM, “mean that your patent is 
largely unchallengeable by the same party.”35 Finally, echoing Congres-
sional statements made during the original debate of reexaminations in 1980, 
Senator Grassley stated that, “ideally,” IPR “will completely substitute for at 
least the patents-and-printed publications portion of the civil litigation.”36 
The PGR estoppel statute is virtually identical to that of IPR, with the 
“raised or reasonably could have raised” language and application to subse-
quent USPTO proceedings, district courts actions, and ITC actions.37 While 
these estoppel statutes seem easy to apply in theory, and the legislative intent 
clear, it is proving somewhat difficult to work with in practice. There are 
many opinions interpreting the estoppel statute in relation to IPR, but the 
most notable opinion is Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys-
tems.38 
In this opinion, the Federal Circuit held that “[b]oth parts of § 315(e) 
create estoppel for arguments ‘on any ground that the petitioner raised or 
reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.’”39 This is im-
portant because Petitioner Shaw raised an argument in the petition based on 
a patent (the “Payne” reference). As to that ground, the PTO denied the pe-
tition.40 The Federal Circuit found that because no IPR was instituted on that 
particular ground in Shaw’s petition, “Shaw did not raise—nor could it have 
reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.”41 Looking 
quite literally to the IPR estoppel statute, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he 
plain language of the statute prohibits the application of estoppel under these 
 
 34.  Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *4 (E.D. 
Tex. May 11, 2017)  
 35.  America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition 
and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 53 (2011) (statement of Honorable David 
Kappos, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office). 
 36.  157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 37.  See, e.g., Major Differences between IPR, PGR, and CBM: AIA Trial Comparison Chart, U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia_trial_compari-
son_chart.pptx (last visited Mar. 2, 2018). 
 38.  Shaw Indus. Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id.  
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circumstances.”42 This opinion then seemingly stands for the understanding 
that the IPR estoppel, and perhaps also the PGR and CBM estoppel statutes, 
does not work to estop an IPR petitioner from challenging a patent based on 
petitioned, but non-instituted grounds of unpatentability. 
Many patent commentators have noted that this holding seems contrary 
to the legislative intent,43 with others discussing the potential downstream 
effects of this opinion.44 District courts have also interpreted the Shaw opin-
ion in a variety of ways, creating inconsistent results across the U.S.45 De-
spite these inconsistencies, post-grant petitioners in the U.S. are well advised 
to proceed with an awareness that their first shot may very well be their very 
last shot.  
In contrast, there is no such estoppel statute applicable to the European 
opposition46 or Japanese opposition systems.47 For both systems, this means 
that if the petitioner loses on one or all of its grounds, it may repeat the same 
validity challenges in future proceedings.  
This makes opposition systems with no estoppel doctrine quite attrac-
tive as a testing ground for presentation of arguments. With the combination 
of no estoppel statutes and remarkably lower filing fees, parties should argu-
ably proceed first with the EPO or JPO as a matter of basic strategy for chal-
lenging a multi-national patent. This of course is largely dependent on patent 
issuance dates in the respective countries.  
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See, e.g., Scott McKeown, PTAB Redundant Ground Practice Complicating Estoppel, PATS. 
POST-GRANT (Jan. 12, 2007), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-redundant-ground-practice-com-
plicating-estoppel/.  
 44.  See, e.g., Andrew W. Williams & James L. Lovsin, Post-Grant Review Estoppel – Looking 
Forward by Looking Back at Estoppel in Inter-Partes and Covered-Business-Method Review, JD SUPRA 
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/post-grant-review-estoppel-looking-60342/; David 
Cavanaugh & John C. Polley, Strategic Considerations of Estoppel for IPRs After Shaw Industries Group 
v. Automated Creel Systems, 91 P.T.C.J. 1711, 1743–44 (2016); Brian S. Mudge & Ksenia Takhistova, 
Federal Circuit: Estoppel Does Not Apply to Non-Instituted Grounds, IPR BLOG (May 31, 2016), 
http://interpartesreviewblog.com/federal-circuit-estoppel-not-apply-non-instituted-grounds/.  
 45.  See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp, No. Civ. 13-453-SLR/SRF, 2015 WL 
3773779, at *3 (D. Del. May 15, 2015) (discussing Shaw and holding it was necessary to interpret the 
scope of estoppel narrowly, applying estoppel to prior art or publications actually instituted in the IPR); 
Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *4–7 (E.D. Tex. May 
11, 2017) (viewing Shaw as limited to its unique facts after reviewing the legislative intention of the 
estoppel statute and deciding the statute should be more interpreted more broadly so that the IPR serves 
as a sort of substitute for civil litigation).  
 46.  See Flibbert, supra note 2 (discussing the trigger of estoppel in an IPR or PGR and stating “[i]n 
Europe there is no such estoppel.”). 
 47.  The term “double jeopardy” is also used to describe the doctrine of estoppel by Japanese attor-
neys, seemingly signaling how they view redundant litigation. See Saito & Hirata, supra note 26, at 6. 
That said, “[t]he doctrine of estoppel (prohibition of double jeopardy) applies to a conclusive decision on 
an invalidation trial.” Id.  
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Between Japan and the European Union, the EPO’s post-grant opposi-
tion system is the most well-known and tried system, with relatively little 
downstream cost to future administrative proceedings or judicial actions. 
This makes Europe the test ground for challenging patents, as well as a patent 
holder’s willingness to litigate on multiple fronts to retain key features of the 
patent, such as breadth of claims and priority date.  
This means that until international harmonization is achieved among at 
least the IP5, the patent offices of the U.S., Japan, Korea, China, and the 
European Union, it is difficult to motivate parties to not engage in strategic 
behavior that may lead to abuses of the patent system. And even if parties’ 
behavior is not abusive, innovative technology and science is growing on an 
increasingly global scale. More international harmonization is needed to in-
crease efficiency and encourage parties to focus on collaboration instead of 
litigation. 
 
